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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF U T A H
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
CORPORATION OF T H E PRESID E N T OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
a Utah corporation sole,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case N o .
13704

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
An Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Presiding

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from the assignment by Kerry-Aldon,
Inc. of certain accounts receivable to respondent Bank of
Salt Lake. After the debtor, appellant Corporation of
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints made payments to Kerry-Aldon, respondent brought
suit against appellants for recovery of the amounts assigned. From a judgment in favor of respondent, appellant appeals.
1
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DISPOSITION OF CASE I N LOWER COURT
The court below awarded judgment to respondent
in the sum of $59,205.80 plus interest and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment rendered by the court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This lawsuit arose out of certain transactions which
occurred during the years 1968 and 1969 between the
plaintiff Bank of Salt Lake and the defendant Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Kerry-Aldon Associates (later Kerry-Aldon, Inc.). The basic underlying
facts are these: During the years 1968 and 1969 the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, Department of Seminaries and Institutes purchased various items of furniture and equipment from Kerry-Aldon Associates. The Bank of Salt
Lake was financing the operation of Kerry-Aldon Associates, having taken an Assignment of Kerry-Aldon's receivables from the L.D.S. Church as security for that
financing (R. 13, Exhibits 2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C).
T o assure payment on the accounts receivable and
to protect its security interest therein, the Bank of Salt
Lake sent four letters to a Mr. Leland Bruderer, Seminaries and Institutes of the L.D.S. Church, Union Pacific
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 (R. 171; 2-P-C,
3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C). In substance these letters requested
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Mr. Bruderer, on behalf of Seminaries and Institutes of
the L.D.S. Church, to acknowledge the Bank's interest
in various invoices, as granted by an Assignment from
Kerry-Aldon Associates. On the bottom of each letter
was an acknowledgement that provided:
Seminaries and Institutes, L.D.S. Church,
hereby acknowledges the indebtedness described
above and agrees to the Assignment consenting to
make all disbursements on the above invoices payable to the Bank of Salt Lake and Kerry-Aldon
Associates, jointly, and to mail such disbursements
to the Bank of Salt Lake, 3081 South State, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
Seminaries and Institutes,
L.D.S. Church
Date:
By: s/ Leland R. Bruderer
Title
Records & Budget Offices
(Exhibits 2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C)
Those letters, together with the acknowledgements, were
delivered to Leland Bruderer and he, in turn, signed them
and returned them to the Bank of Salt Lake (Id.)
Mr. Bruderer indicated in his testimony that at the
time he signed the acknowledgements he was aware that
the Bank of Salt Lake had taken an Assignment of the
funds owing by the Church to secure the loans to KerryAldon, Inc. (R. 103). He further testified that he did not
have the authority to direct how payment would be made
on the invoices, but he also admitted that he did not
inform the Bank of that fact at any time over the period
that these acknowledgements were signed or any time
thereafter (R. 104, 105).
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At the time he signed the acknowledgements Mr.
Bruderer worked in the Budget and Records Office of
the Seminaries and Institutes Department of the appellant corporation (R. 99). His job required that he supervise the payroll; code expense documents; provide estimates of costs incurred in furnishing seminary and institute buildings; prepare requisitions for such furnishings;
and make recommendations for purchase of furnishings
(R. 100, 101).
Mr. Bruderer also testified that his recommendations
on purchases were forwarded to the purchasing department and it in turn would issue a purchase order generally following his recommendations. H e apparently
was hired by the Church for his expertise in this particular area and for that reason the Church generally followed his recommendations as to purchase of furniture
and equipment (R. 102).
It was in connection with his job that Mr. Bruderer
frequently dealt with Kerry-Aldon which supplied various materials to the Department of Seminaries and Institutes (R. 103). In fact, when Aldon Cook, a principal
in Kerry-Aldon, was introduced to Bruderer by his then
sales manager, Bruderer was presented as the man to
talk to about sales "to the Church'' (R. 38). Under these
circumstances, Aldon Cook informed the Bank of Salt
Lake that the request for acknowledgement of the Assignment should be directed to Leland Bruderer. The
requests for acknowledgements were, in fact, so directed
and Mr. Bruderer acknowledged the same (Exhibits
2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C, 5-P-C). Following these events
checks were issued on the invoices assigned to the Bank
4
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of Salt Lake by the Church, but made payable to KerryAldon Associates and not jointly to Kerry-Aldon Associates and the Bank (Exhibits D-24, D-25, D-26).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT H A D NOTICE OF THE FACT
T H A T KERRY-ALDON, I N C H A D ASSIGNED ITS ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE T O
RESPONDENT
The evidence in this case is undisputed that Leland
Bruderer, an employee in the Seminaries and Institutes
Office of appellant corporation, received notice of the
assignment of Kerry-Aldon's accounts receivables to respondent.
It is well established that a debtor is liable to the
assignee if after receiving notice of the assignment he
nonetheless makes payments to the creditor/assignor. 6
Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments § 96, states the rule as follows:
In some cases it is stated broadly that an assignment of a chose in action is not complete, so
as to vest title absolutely in the assignee, until
notice of the assignment has been given to the
debtor, . . . But generally if, after receiving notice
or obtaining knowledge of the assignment, the
debtor pays, or compromises with the assignor,
he will not be protected as against the assignee.
This rule has been codified in § 9-318(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 7OA-9-3180), UCA (1953))
which provides:
The account debtor is authorized to pay the
assignor until the account debtor receives notifi5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cation that the account has been assigned and that
payment is to be made to the assignee. A notification which does not reasonably identify the rights
assigned is ineffective. If requested by the account
debtor, the assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made
and unless he does so the account debtor may pay
the assignor.
It will be observed that the only requirement of the
statute is that the notification ' 'reasonably identify the
rights assigned/' Also, if requested by the debtor the
assignee may be required to provide proof of the assignment. However, neither the common law rule nor the
statute gives the debtor the option of refusing to accept
the assignment.
The effect of this aspect of the rule can be seen in
the case of Time Finance Corporation vs. Johnson Trucking Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 873 (1969). There the
assignor, Johnson Trucking Co., as security for a note
had assigned its interest in proceeds from an insurance
claim to plaintiff, Time Finance. At the request of the
assignee an agent of the assignor went to the office of
his insurance agent and informed him of the assignment.
The agent then informed the claims department which refused to place the assignee's name on the draft. Later the
check was paid to the assignor who deposited it with the
insurance agent for the assignee. Before the assignee
could pick the check u p the agency became insolvent and
Time never received its money. Time then sued Johnson
and Johnson cross-claimed against the insurer, Occidental. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Time;
Occidental was ordered to pay the judgment.
6
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On appeal Occidental argued that its agent was not
within the scope of his authority in receiving notice of
the assignment. The court rejected this argument saying:
The essential issue is whether Occidental received notice of the assignment of proceeds. When
an obligee has acquired the right to receive money,
it is his prerogative to assign it to whomsoever
he selects; it is not essential that the debtor agree
to the arrangement. When the obligor receives
proper notice of the assignment he must honor it.
If agent Mang received notice of the assignment of the proceeds, then Occidental, the principal, received notification and was bound to honor
it. 23 Utah 2d at 118.
In the instant case the uncontradicted evidence is that
Leland Bruderer was an employee of appellant who had
dealt with Aldon Cook, the presenter of the notice, on
numerous occasions. Among his duties were the following:
1. T o coordinate payroll and benefits in the Department of Seminaries and Institutes (R. 98, 100);
2. T o work in the Budget and Records office (R.
99);
3. T o code expense documents (R. 100);
4. T o estimate costs in the building or funmhmu
of seminary or institute buildings (R. 99);
5. To prepare requisitions in furnishing or building institute or seminary buildings (R. 99);
6. T o recommend purchase of office and classroom furniture (R. 101, 102); and
7. To screen peddlers and salesmen from those
who made the final decision as to purchases (R. 102).
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Notwithstanding the above facts appellant contends
in Points I and II of its Brief that notice to Bruderer was
ineffective in giving notice to appellant of the assignment. This position appears to be based upon the mistaken premise that appellant corporation could disapprove the assignment and that only certain corporate officers had such veto power. Such a view is clearly erroneous in view of § 70A-9-318O), UCA (1953) and the
Time Finance case which indicate that once the debtor receives notice nothing more need be done to perfect the
assignment.
Appellant further argues that notice to Bruderer was
insufficient since he "had {never] been authorized in
the past to acknowledge corporate indebtedness, {to}
agree to and accept notice of assignments of corporate
debt, or {to} draw and mail corporate checks on behalf
of appellant/' Appellant's Brief at p. 14. In this regard
appellant appears to equate those who can enter contractual obligations on behalf of the corporation with those
who can receive notice. This position clearly contradicts
statutes, case law, and the views of legal writers.
The definition section of the Uniform Commercial
Code contains the following passages.
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives"
or notification to another by taking such
may be reasonably required to inform the
ordinary course whether or not such other
comes to know of it. A person "receives"
or notification when

a notice
steps as
other in
actually
a notice

(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) // is duly delivered to the place of business
through which the contract was made or at any
8
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other place held out by him as the place for receipt
of such communications.
(27) Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is effective for
a particular transaction from the time when it is
brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the
time when it would have been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due diligence. An organization exercises due diligence
if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable
compliance with the routines. Due diligence does
not require an individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless such communication is part of his regular duties or unless
he has reason to know of the transaction and that
the transaction would be materially affected by the
information.
§ 70A-1-20K26) and (27), UCA (1953) {Emphasis
added.}
In the instant case the evidence indicates that Aldon
Cook delivered written notice of the assignment to Leland
Bruderer at his home and at his office (R. 171). The evidence also indicates that Cook had dealt with Bruderer
on numerous occasions in connection with sale of furnishings to the Seminaries and Institutes Department (R. 10,
38, 39, 42, 63). Under the provisions of § 70A-1-201(26)(a), UCA (1953) Bruderer received notice because it
came to his attention. According to § 70A-1-201 (27),
UCA (1953) notice to Bruderer is notice to appellant
"from the time when [the transaction] is brought to the
attention of the individual conducting that transaction,.. .**
9
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If the word ' 'transaction" refers to the receipt of
notice, Mr. Bruderer was quite clearly conducting the
transaction because he was the receiver. Similarly, if
"transaction" refers to the various sales recited in the
invoices, he was one of appellant's employees involved
in these transactions as one who prepares requisitions and
recommends purchase of goods. In any case, as the last
sentence of subsection (27) makes clear, Mr. Bruderer's
knowledge of the transaction and of the fact that the
transaction would be materially affected by the notice of
assignment clearly imputes notice to appellant.
In this regard the official comments to § 1-201(27)
of the Uniform Commercial Code contains the following
pertinent language:
27. This makes clear that reason to know,
knowledge, or a notification, although "received"
for instance by a clerk in Department A of an organization, is effective for a transaction conducted
in Department B only from the time it was or
should have been communicated to the individual
conducting that transaction.
Thus, according to the official Comment for subsection (27) appellant received notice of the assignment at
that point in time when Mr. Bruderer should have "communicated {with} the individual conducting the transaction." Since most of the assigned invoices were not
paid for periods ranging one to seven weeks after the
assignments, (Exhibits 23-D, 24-D, and 25-D), Mr. Bruderer had ample time to communicate his knowledge of
the assignment to the appropriate individuals. That he
did not is attributable to appellant's lack of due diligence,
not respondent's.
10
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Furthermore, § 70A-l-201(26)(b), UCA (1953) indicates that the notices delivered to Mr. Bruderer's office
comprise notice received by the organization or individual if the contract was made at the office or if the office
was held out to him as the place where such notice could
be given.
While it is unclear where the contract for purchase
of any particular item was made, it is clear that much of
the concomitant negotiations and discussions occurred in
Leland Bruderer's offices. Thus, it might be reasonably
inferred that the contract for sale of the items was made
in his office. Since two of the three notices were delivered to that office, appellant received notice by virtue of
their delivery to that office. § 70A-l-201(26)(b), supra.
The correctness of the above statements can be seen
in Time Finance, supra, and other cases. In Time Finance
notice of the assignment was presented to an insurance
agent who worked in an agency affiliated with the debtor.
There was no indication that the agent had been designated as one to whom such notice could be given; nor
was he an agent or employee to whom authority had been
given to acknowledge debts or to draw or mail corporate
checks. Nonetheless the court's decision indicates that
notice to the agent was sufficient, 23 Utah 2d at 118,
even though the case was remanded for a determination
as to whether the communication was notice of an assignment or merely notice of the existence of a lien holder.
(In the instant case there is no such ambiguity.)
Similarly, in Cooper vs. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40,
440 P.2d 15 (1968) this court held that notice of
11
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an assignment of a municipal debt when given to
the mayor was sufficient to bind the municipality.
The city argued unsuccessfully that the mayor was not
the proper party to receive notice because by statute only
the mayor and city council acting together could approve
"propositions to create any liability against the City."
21 Utah 2d at 42. It was also argued that notice to the
mayor was improper since contracts to which the city
was a party had to be signed by the city recorder. Id.
Rejecting these arguments the court noted that while
the policy decisions of the city were to be made by individuals other than the mayor
there is . . . no policy decision to be made as to
whether the City will pay what it owes for the
services received. 21 Utah 2d at 42.
The same reasoning might be applied to the instant
case. For while it may be true that Leland Bruderer
could not make decisions as to corporation affairs, he
could receive notice of an assignment. The latter involves
no policy making.
Two further cases from sister states also deserve
mention. In Ertel vs. RCA, 307 N.E. 2d 471, 14 U . C C
Reptr. Serv. 514 (Feb. 1974) notice of assignment of
accounts receivable which was sent by certified mail and
received by a dock employee was held to be sufficient,
even though the accounting department received no
notice.
In Gateway National Bank vs. Saxe, Bacon and
Bolan, 336 N.Y.S. 2d 668, 11 U.CC. Reptr. Serv. 668
12
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(1972) notice of assignment of accounts receivable was
held sufficient as against a law partnership where one
partner received the notice.
Finally, in his treatise on corporations Fletcher makes
the following statement as to notice given to an employee:
It would seem that the best test of imputation
of knowledge is not whether the agent, whose
knowledge is sought to be attributed to the corporation is president, treasurer, and so forth, but
whether the condition and facts known were within
the sphere of the authority of the particular agent.
3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations 60 (1965
Revised Volume) {Emphasis added.]
Among those agents to whom notice was given which
bound the corporation, Fletcher lists the following:
foreman in charge of work to which the notice or
knowledge relates, . . . shipping clerk, claim agent,
freight clerk, station agent, . . . trouble clerk, . . .
a bookkeeper, . . . [and} purchasing agent. . . .
Id. at 62,63, 64.
In the instant case Leland Bruderer received knowledge of the assignment, not by accident in a bar or cafeteria, but as an employee of appellant acting within his
sphere of authority. His position in the corporation is
closely analogous to a trouble agent, clerk, or purchasing
agent. As such notice to him was notice to the corporation. Fletcher, supra.

13
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P O I N T II
AS A N AGENT OF THE APPELLANT CORPORATION, LELAND BRUDERER H A D APPARENT A U T H O R I T Y T O RECEIVE THE
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT
Even if this court holds that only a few designated
officials of appellant corporation could receive the notice
of assignment, and that Leland Bruderer was not among
them, it is nonetheless clear that appellant vested him
with indicia of such authority sufficient to comprise apparent authority.
There appears to be no question but that an Assignment was executed on behalf of Kerry-Aldon Associates in favor of the Bank of Salt Lake and further that
the Bank of Salt Lake gave notice of its Assignment to
one Leland Bruderer of the Seminaries and Institutes of
the L.D.S. Church. The only question that exists is
whether or not notice on behalf of the Bank to Mr.
Bruderer constituted sufficient notice to Mr. Bruderer's
principal, the Corporation of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, so as to bind it under
the terms of the Assignment and allow the Bank to seek
recovery against said defendant for failing to abide by
the terms of the Assignment.
In regard to the payment by a debtor on an assigned
claim, the courts in the State of Utah have held that once
the debtor receives proper notice of the Assignment he
must honor it. Time Finance Corp. vs. Johnson Trucking Co., supra. Appellant argues that Leland Bruderer
was without authority to receive such notice. Even if it

14
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were true that only certain officers could receive notice,
Mr. Bruderer apparently had such authority. The general rule as to the binding effect of acts of an officer or
agent of a corporation on the corporation itself is found
in 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations, § 1165:
. . . [A] corporation is bound by the acts of its
officers and agents acting within the apparent
scope of their authority and if the officer or agent
appears to be acting within his authority, the person dealing with him is not charged with knowledge of extrinsic facts making it improper for
him to act in that case. Id. at 592
This particular section of Am. Jur. goes on further to
state that unless circumstances surrounding any particular transaction are of such a nature as to put a person
dealing with an officer or agent of a corporation upon
inquiry as to his actual authority, then such person shall
not be bound to determine the exact nature of the authority of such officer or agent of the corporation. 19
Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1165, pp. 592, 593
Section 1164 of 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations, provides additional insight as to when a corporation may
be bound by the acts of its agents, to wit:
. . . {W]hen, in the usual course of the business of a corporation, an officer or other agent
is held out by the corporation or has been permitted to act for it or manage its affairs in such
a way as to justify third persons who deal with
him in inferring or assuming that he is doing an
act or making a contract within the scope of his
authority, the corporation is bound thereby, even
15
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though such officer or agent has not the actual
authority from the corporation to do such an act
or make such a contract. Id. at 591.
These general rules have been recognized in the
courts of Utah in the following cases: Harrison vs. Auto
Securities Corp., et al., 70 Utah 11, 237 P. 677 (1927);
Santi vs. Denver and Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., 21 Utah
2d 157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968). In the Harrison case above
cited the court stated the reasoning behind holding a
principal responsible for the acts of an agent with the
apparent authority to perform such acts:
. • . {W}hen one of two innocent parties must
suffer from the wrongful act of a third person,
. . . the loss should fall upon the one who by his
conduct created the circumstances which enabled
the third party to perpetrate the wrong and cause
the loss, . . . ( 2 5 7 P. at 679)
The court in Harrison, as well as Santi, determined that
when a third party deals with the principal's agent in
good faith and it appears that said agent has authority
to enter into a contract, etc., such third party should not
be required to bear any loss that may result due to the
lack of that agent's authority. That position has also
been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 8(b), and comment thereto.
Under the general law set forth above and recognized by the State of Utah, it has been held that the principal shall be estopped to deny the agency relationship
where:
. . . {A] principal has, by his voluntary act,
placed an agent in such a situation that a person
of ordinary prudence conversant with business
16
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usages and the nature of the particular business
is justified in assuming that such agent has authority to perform a particular act and deals with
the agent upon that assumption, the principal is
estopped as against such third person from denying the agent's authority; he will not be permitted
to prove that the agent's authority was in fact less
extensive than that with which he was apparently
clothed. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 76; cf. Harrison
vs. Auto Securities Corp., supra.
Plaintiff submits that based on the law heretofore
cited and the facts of this case, the defendant Corporation
of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, should be estopped to deny that Leland Bruderer had no authority to execute the Assignments upon
which the Bank of Salt Lake relied to its detriment. The
facts of this case show that the defendant above-named
had placed Leland Bruderer in a position of authority
as an office manager with the Seminaries and Institutes
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In
that capacity Mr. Bruderer was responsible for the requisitioning and ordering of furnishings and equipment for
all Seminaries and Institutes within the Church during
the years 1968 and 1969. Mr. Bruderer had been hired
for the purpose of making recommendations to the Church
purchasing office as to what furnishings and equipment
should be purchased. His recommendations were generally followed by the purchasing department. While
acting in that capacity he had dealt with Kerry-Aldon
Associates for the purpose of obtaining various items
of furniture and equipment and had in fact ordered certain items from Kerry-Aldon Associates for the purpose
of furnishing various Seminary and Institute buildings
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owned or operated by the Church. It was under those
circumstances that the Bank of Salt Lake sent Mr. Bruderer certain letters with acknowledgements attached
thereto which acknowledged assignment on behalf of
Kerry-Aldon Associates of the various accounts receivable from the Church to the Bank. Mr. Bruderer was
aware that Kerry-Aldon Associates was obtaining financing from the Bank based upon those Assignments of accounts receivables and in light of that, signed acknowledgements of the Assignments and agreed that all payments under the Assignments would be jointly to KerryAldon Associates and to the Bank of Salt Lake. Further,
Mr. Bruderer signed under the heading, ' 'Seminaries and
Institutes, L.D.S. Church" and over the title "Budget and
Record Offices. ,,
The Bank of Salt Lake was informed by Aldon Cook
that the letters requesting acknowledgements should go
to Leland Bruderer. That the Bank followed these instructions was evidenced by Exhibits 2-P-C, 3-P-C, 4-P-C,
and 5-P-C, which were directed to Mr. Bruderer and he
signed those acknowledgements over a period of approximately three months. Mr. Bruderer testified that at the
time he signed the acknowledgements he told Aldon Cook
that he did not have any authority to sign them, although he also testified that at no time did he inform
anyone at the Bank of Salt Lake of that fact. Furthermore, he did not inform any other employee or officer
of the defendant Corporation of the President of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints of the Assignments to the Bank which had been acknowledged
by him.
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As a result of the foregoing, checks were made payable to Kerry-Aldon Associates on various invoices that
had been assigned to the Bank, but upon which the Bank
was not named as a co-payee. The Bank became aware
of this and sent another letter to Mr. Bruderer on October
13, 1969 advising him of the appellant's failure to abide
by the terms of the Assignment which the Bank had entered into in good faith. (Exhibit 10-P)
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Bank of
Salt Lake, relying upon the representations of Aldon Cook
and those of Mr. Leland Bruderer signing for the Seminaries and Institutes of the L.D.S. Church, advanced
money to Kerry-Aldon Associates using as security Assignments of accounts receivable owing to Kerry-Aldon
Associates from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints; that at the time those accounts receivable were
acknowledged by Mr. Bruderer he was in fact responsible
for the requisitioning and ordering of office furnishings
and equipment for the Seminaries and Institutes of the
L.D.S. Church; that all the invoices involved in this action, the Assignments of which were given to the Bank
of Kerry-Aldon Associates, were for furnishings and
equipment used in the Seminaries and Institutes of the
L.D.S. Church.
Therefore, the appellant-defendant Corporation of
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints having placed Mr. Bruderer in a position of
authority with the Seminaries and Institutes Department
and having authorized him to order and requisition office furnishings and equipment for Seminaries and In19
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stitutes buildings clothed Mr. Bruderer with the apparent
authority to execute the acknowledgement on behalf of
the Seminaries and Institutes of the L.D.S. Church.
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Bruderer signed three
acknowledgements over a period of approximately three
months making no mention of any lack of authority to
the Bank or anyone else, would seem to bring this case
in line with the Harrison case cited above so that the
loss should fall upon the party responsible for placing an
agent in the position and clothing him with the apparent
authority to perform the acts which caused the loss. In
this case, the Corporation of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints did place Mr. Bruderer in that position and the Bank, having no other information, acted in good faith in dealing with Mr. Bruderer.
Plaintiff therefore submits that the Assignment executed by Mr. Bruderer was done so with the apparent
authority of the defendant the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
and that said Assignment is binding upon said defendant
and that said defendant is liable to the plaintiff for any
and all amounts paid to Kerry-Aldon Associates in violation of the Assignment of accounts receivable.
P O I N T III
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY RULED
T H A T RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED THE AMOUNT BY W H I C H THE ACCOUNTS EXCEEDED I N VALUE THE NOTES
W H I C H THE SECURED
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In its Point III appellant argues that the lower court
committed reversible error in awarding to respondent
the difference between the value of the accounts assigned
and that of the notes which secured them.
As support for this theory, appellant recites § 70A9-504(2), UCA (1953) which provides:
If the security interest secures an indebtedness,
the secured party must account to the debtor for
any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency.
Appellant's position would, perhaps, have some validity if the Uniform Commercial Code prevented the same
party from taking more than one security interest in an
account, or if respondent had no security interest in the
amount of the excess. However, neither of these conditions are met here.
Even a cursory reading of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, particularly Part 3, reveals that more
than one security interest may be taken in a single chattel, intangible, account, etc. While it is true that in most
cases different parties hold such interests, there is no
prohibition on a single creditor holding more than one
security interest in a single account.
In the instant case it is clear from the evidence that
the Bank of Salt Lake had a perfected security interest
in all of Kerry-Aldon's accounts receivable, including
the amount of the excess (Exhibit 6-P). Thus, in effect,
there were two security interests in the accounts: The
first, which was in the amount of the notes, was satisfied
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by virtue of the lower court's decision that appellant's
payments to Kerry-Aldon on the assigned invoices did
not discharge appellant's liability to respondent. The second security interest was thus in the balance of the accounts. The court's awarding of this amount to respondent was simply a judicial determination that this second security interest in the balance of the accounts was
valid and had priority over any other security interests.
If appellant's objection to the lower court's decision
goes to the propriety of the court's apparent finding that
as to the excess respondent's interest was valid and prior,
then clearly appellant lacks standing to make such an
attack unless appellant is somehow asserting a security
interest in the excess. Since no such assertion appears
either in the record or in its brief, appellant is clearly
an improper party to object to the lower court's award
of the excess to respondent.
Thus, not only was the lower court's determination
proper, but appellant is not the proper party to raise
the issue of impropriety.

P O I N T IV
FAILURE BY THE BANK OF SALT LAKE T O
SETOFF KERRY-ALDONS DEPOSITS I N
ITS ACCOUNT I N THE BANK AGAINST
THE U N P A I D ASSIGNED ACCOUNTS HELD
BY APPELLANT DOES N O T BAR RESPONDENT'S RECOVERY FROM APPELLANT
In its Point IV appellant advances the novel theory
that failure by the bank to exercise an alleged right of
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setoff against Kerry-Aldon bars the bank's recovery from
appellant. As support for its theory appellant points to
the maxim enunciated in Harrison, supra, that as between two innocent parties suffering injury the one creating the circumstance which enabled a third party to
cause the loss should bear the loss.
The weakness of this argument is that it was appellant's failure to abide by the notice of assignment
which created the opportunity for Kerry-Aldon to receive and dispose of the account proceeds. Any necessity of offsetting Kerry-Aldon's deposits could only have
been occasioned by appellant's failure to observe its duty
once notified of the assignment.
Indeed, it is clear that the bank was under no duty
to offset. Regarding a bank's right to offset 10 Am. Jur.
2d Banks § 666 states the following rule:
It is a general rule that when a depositor is
indebted to a bank, and the debts are mutual . . .
the bank may apply the deposit, or such portion
thereof as may be necessary, to the payment of
the debt due it by the depositor, . . . [Emphasis
added.)
See also, Moab National Bank vs. Keystone-Wallace Resources, 30 Utah 2d 330, 334, 517 P.2d 1020 (1973);
Seaboard Finance Co .vs. Shire, 117 Utah 546,218 P.2d 282,
284 (1950). It is thus clear that the Bank's right of setoff
was not compulsory.
Contrariwise, it is well established that failure to
exercise the right of setoff cannot result in a bank's liability:
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This {right of setoff) is a privilege which the
bank has; no case has gone so far as to hold it to
be a duty owing by the bank to one primarily
liable on the note to so apply the deposit. On the
contrary, it has been expressly held that the bank
is under no duty to the primary debtor to make
the application. 9A.L.R. 181.
There are good policy reasons for such a rule. Zollman makes the following observation:
Business would be very insecure indeed if a
bank which held unmatured notes could at its
option seize the deposit of the maker upon learning of his possible insolvency. It would thus withdraw the very capital upon which the debtor relies
to extricate himself from his insecure position.
. . . If the rule were strictly applied, every such
debtor compelled by slow collections to request
an extension of his credits and unable to pay them
at the very day of maturity would be at the mercy
of the bank. Therefore the rule must be applied
in accordance with the facts in each case. 7 Zollman, Banks and Banking § 4472.
In the instant case the facts indicate that KerryAldon's notes were secured by accounts held by a large,
obviously solvent, corporation. It had received acknowledgement from the corporation of the assignment. Under
the circumstances the Bank's failure to offset appears reasonable.
Furthermore, this court long ago held
of offset is precluded where the security
exhausted. Seaboard Finance Co. vs. Shire,
instant case the bank had not exhausted

that the right
has not been
supra. In the
the collateral
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(i.e., the accounts receivable) at the time when it is alleged the offset should have been made. Therefore, it
could not have offset against Kerry-Aldon's deposits.
Appellant's final argument is that the doctrine of
avoidable consequences required respondent to offset.
Under the facts in this case such a view contradicts the
rule set forth in the Seaboard case. In any event, while
the doctrine may apply in the contractual setting, it
should be observed that in the instant case there was no
contractual relationship between appellant and respondent. Therefore, respondent had no duty to appellant to
mitigate damages caused by the corporation's failure to
include respondent as a payee.
POINT V
ANY ALLEGED INACCURACIES IN THE ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT, NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT, OR INVOICES ARE N O T SUFFICIENT T O RELIEVE APPELLANT FROM
ITS LIABILITY T O RESPONDENT
Point V of appellant's Brief contains a potpourri of
arguments, most of which concern alleged inaccuracies
in the various documents relating to the assignments. For
convenience these arguments might be lumped under the
following headings: inaccuracies in the assignment agreements; inaccuracies in the notices of assignment; and inaccuracies in the invoices.
Inaccuracies in the Assignment

Agreement

Appellant asserts that the assignment agreements between Kerry-Aldon and respondent do not specifically
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list the account debtor (appellant), do not adequately describe the invoices evidencing the accounts, and do not
indicate that Aldon Cook signed in his corporate capacity.
Such an observation is irrelevant in view of the fact that
appellant was given a notice of assignment which contained the necessary information. In any case no privity
of contract existed between respondent and appellant.
Thus, only Kerry-Aldon has standing to attack the insufficiency of the assignment.
Inaccuracies in the Notice
Appellant implies that the respondent's failure to
list Kerry-Aldon, Inc., rather than Kerry-Aldon Associates
and its failure to correctly list Leland Bruderer's official
title were fatal to giving appellant adequate notice.
Section 70A-9-318(3), UCA (1953) states that notification of an assignment is effective if it reasonably identifies the rights assigned. Thus, failure to correctly list Leland Bruderer's position on the notice does not effect its
validity. Furthermore, it is submitted that the naming of
Kerry-Aldon Associates, rather than Kerry-Aldon, Inc.,
is not so confusing as to render the notice ineffective, particularly since the corporation was merely a continuance
of the partnership and appellant had dealt with both.
Inaccuracies in the Invoices
Appellant further notes that at least two of the invoices listed in the various notices contained errors. Invoice 1171, for example, is incorrectly listed on the notice
as being in the sum of $34,966 when in reality the amount
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was less than $100. A second invoice in the amount of
$221 related to a transaction with a party unconnected
to the appellant. Appellant asserts that it is not liable
to respondent for these amounts.
This position is incorrect for two reasons: First,
through its agent, Leland Bruderer, appellant acknowledged the correctness of the amounts listed as being due
as proceeds of the invoices. The acknowledgement dated
March 21, 1969, for example, reads in part:
Seminaries and Institutes, L.D.S. Church, hereby acknowledges the indebtedness described
above...
The portion of the notice referred to reads:
Kerry-Aldon Associates . . . as consideration
for credit extended to them by the Bank of Salt
Lake has assigned the proceeds of invoice # 1 1 7 1
in the amount of $34,966.
A similar acknowledgement was made on the notice of
March 7, 1969 concerning invoice # 1 1 3 7 for items sold
to a third party.
While admittedly the invoices described above were
not as represented, it does not follow that the loss should
fall upon respondent. On the contrary, the rule laid
down in Harrison, supra, indicates that the loss should
fall on appellant. As between the parties, appellant was
in a much better position to determine the accuracy of
the assignment, notice, and acknowledgement. As a third
party to Kerry-Aldon's contract with the appellant the
Bank had to rely on the appellant to inform it of any
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discrepancies. Thus, it was appellant, not respondent,
who created the circumstances which enabled Kerry-Aldon
to cause the loss.
Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
leads to a similar conclusion. This court has adopted the
following rule:
'Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the
notion that, when one person makes representations
to another which warrant the latter in acting in a
given way, the one making such representations
will not be permitted to change his position when
such changes would bring about inequitable consequences to the other person, who relied on the
representations and acted thereon in good faith.
* * * The representations made must be in
themselves sufficient to warrant the action taken,
and their sufficiency is a judicial question. . . /
Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Cr.
Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 159, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955)
quoting / . T. Fargason Co. v. Furst, 287 F. 306,
310 (8th Cir.)
In the instant case respondent received from one of
appellant's agents an unequivocal acknowledgement of
the debt described in the Bank's notice. The acknowledgement gave no indication that the debts described were
either inaccurate or contingent. Thus, appellant could
reasonably foresee that respondent would rely on the
acknowledgement and that respondent would continue
to advance credit to Kerry-Aldon and to honor loans made
to Kerry-Aldon in reliance upon those acknowledgements.
For these reasons appellant should be estopped from now
denying that the acknowledgement was accurate.
28
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In an almost identical case the Supreme Court of
Florida has held that an account debtor was estopped from
denying an acknowledgement which read:
Receipt is acknowledged of the above invoice
and the assignment of this amount to Boulevard
National Bank of Miami, and accordingly, payment
will be made thereto, to Boulevard National Bank.
See Boulevard National Bank vs. Gulf American Land
Corp., 189 So.2d 628 (Fla., 1966), (the facts of the case,
including the above quotation, are found in the appellate
court's decision at 179 So.2d 584, 586 (Fla. App. 1965)).
A similar result in this case would be consistent with that
reached in Boulevard.
In any event, allegations of inaccuracies in the invoices are irrelevant in view of the fact that the Bank
subsequently took a security interest in all of KerryAldon's accounts receivable and that the amount awarded
by the lower court did not exceed the sum of unpaid accounts plus amounts already paid. Thus, appellant is not
required to pay to respondent an amount greater than the
value of the goods it received.
Based upon the foregoing, the inaccuracies in the
various documents mentioned by appellant do not form a
sound basis for reversal of the judgment below.
CONCLUSION
The basic issue involved in this case is whether appellant received notice of the assignment to respondent of
Kerry-Aldon's accounts receivable. To contend, as appel29
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lant does, that Leland Bruderer was not sufficiently high
in appellant's corporate hierarchy to receive notice of the
assignment is to miss the essential point that such notice
can be received by a larger number of employees than
those who could bind appellant contractually. Leland
Bruderer's prominent part in appellant's dealings with
Kerry-Aldon certainly qualifies him as one to whom such
notice could be given.
Furthermore, appellant is estopped from denying or
lacks standing to attack alleged inaccuracies in invoices,
notices, assignment agreements, and acknowledgements.
And in any case such allegations are irrelevant in light
of respondent's subsequent filing of financing statements
covering all of Kerry-Aldon's accounts.
For these reasons the decision of the court below
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CARMAN E. KIPP
of
KIPP A N D CHRISTIAN
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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